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Abstract
We study the role that price transparency plays in determining the efficiency and
surplus division in a sequential bargaining model of price formation with asymmetric in-
formation. Under natural assumptions on type distributions, and for any discount factor,
we show that the unobservability of past negotiations leads to lower prices and faster
trading. The lack of transparency therefore enhances the “Coasian effect” by fostering
efficiency and diverting more of the surplus to the player who possesses private informa-
tion. In addition, we show that the equilibrium is unique and is in pure strategies in the
non-transparent regime; this stands in sharp contrast to the existing literature and allows
for a better understanding of the role of transparency.
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1 Introduction
Many markets operate largely in the absence of price transparency. For instance, in over-the-
counter (OTC) or off-exchange derivatives trading, quotes and executions are confined within
bilateral negotiations, and this information is not available to the rest of the market. Whether
enhancing transparency via facilitating access to information about prices, negotiations, and
transactions may improve efficiency in such markets has been a topic of debate in policy circles.
Increased transparency may enhance efficiency by reducing search costs and fostering compe-
tition. However, in the presence of asymmetric information and dynamic trading—which are
salient features of most markets of interest—potential informational spillovers across players
and over time introduce additional channels through which transparency may influence the
price formation process and hence market outcomes. In this paper we study a sequential bar-
gaining model of price formation and isolate a channel via which increased transparency in this
sense, indeed, unambiguously adversely affects market outcomes.
In our model, a buyer with unitary demand sequentially samples alternative sellers. Once
the seller is sampled, a bargaining stage ensues that takes the form of a take-it-or-leave-it price
offer by the seller. The buyer’s sampling cost is captured by discounting. There is common
knowledge of gains from trade, but the buyer has private information about his willingness to
pay.
Formally, we amend the classic Coasian bargaining with sequential sellers in order to analyze
two opposing information structures. Not only is sequential bargaining a workhorse in analyzing
bilateral interactions, with applications ranging from dispute resolution to labor contracting,
but it is also a theoretically important strategic price formation mechanism. In particular,
bargaining between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players is a building block
of a dynamic search market where each time a participant can meet at most one possible
trading partner.1 Though it is stark compared to the intricacies of real markets, our sequential
bargaining model well describes certain crucial aspects, for instance, of the OTC derivatives
market in which “traders often search for attractive prices by sequentially contacting multiple
counterparties. Once a quote is provided, the opportunity to accept quickly lapses” (Zhu,
2012). Therefore, we believe that the mechanism identified within this model is one of the
forces driving price formation in real markets.
We analyze the role of price transparency in determining the surplus distribution (measured
by the equilibrium prices), and the efficiency of trade (measured by the amount of delay before
trade takes place). More specifically, we compare the equilibrium price sequences and expected
delay under two opposing specifications: one where the past prices are observable to the ensuing
1See, e.g., Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005).
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sellers (transparent regime) and one where they are not (non-transparent regime). Under natural
restrictions on the distribution of the buyer’s valuations, we find that prices are uniformly lower
in the non-transparent regime than in the transparent regime for each given discount factor
of the long-run buyer. Moreover, even though an agreement is eventually reached in either
regime, under further restrictions on the type distribution, the expected delay is larger in the
transparent regime.
All of our results are obtained for arbitrary discount factors of the long-run buyer and not
just for the case where the buyer is sufficiently patient. This feature makes our analysis of the
effect of price transparency robust to the introduction of market frictions, which, beyond its
theoretical interest, is valuable in understanding interactions in real markets where frictions
cannot be ignored. Indeed, for the frictionless limit, the outcomes of both regimes are degen-
erate: trade is efficient and the informed player captures all the surplus. This is consistent
with the classic Coase conjecture. From this perspective, our results imply that, away from the
frictionless limit, a lack of transparency enhances the “Coasian effect” by fostering efficiency
and diverting more of the surplus to the informed player. Moreover, the comparison with the
Coase conjecture implies that transparency matters only in the presence of market frictions.
In an infinite horizon bargaining game without parametric assumptions or closed-form solu-
tions, comparing equilibrium price paths in two different extensive forms is a rather challenging
task. The breakthrough of this paper is made possible by observing that, from the elementary
demand theory, the comparison of equilibrium prices in two markets boils down to the compar-
ison of demand elasticities in these markets. We identify conditions ensuring an appropriate
demand elasticity ranking for our two dynamic bargaining environments. Our appeal to de-
mand theory not only resolves the analytical difficulties, but also highlights the economic forces
at play in dynamic bargaining problems.
To gain some intuition, first recall the well-known “skimming property”: regardless of the
regime and in any equilibrium, a price is accepted by the buyer if and only if his valuation
is above an associated cutoff. This property allows one to interpret the buyer’s decisions as
defining an endogenous demand curve that each seller faces in equilibrium, where the probability
of trade at each price is interpreted as the quantity sold. Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson
(1986) point out that, with this interpretation, when both parties are long-run, their bargaining
problem can equivalently be viewed as the problem of a durable goods monopolist lacking the
power to commit to a price. In contrast to Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986) where a
single durable goods monopolist competes with his future selves, in our model, a sequence of
sellers compete with each other over time. Each seller faces a residual market characterized by
a demand curve endogenously determined by the equilibrium strategies of all past and future
sellers.
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With this interpretation at hand, the crucial exercise is to compare the demand curves
faced by each seller in both regimes. First consider a hypothetical price change by seller
1. Transparency forces seller 2, who enters the game only when there is no trade in the first
period, to respond with a price change in the same direction. In contrast, in the non-transparent
regime, seller 2 cannot react to such a price change. In equilibrium, the buyer fully anticipates
the reaction of seller 2 and hence is less sensitive to the price change by seller 1 in the transparent
regime. That is, the demand curve faced by seller 1 in the transparent regime is steeper than
that in the non-transparent regime. However, the ranking of the slopes of the demand curves
does not translate directly into the ranking of elasticities nor the ranking of profit-maximizing
prices. Indeed, since a seller’s demand curve is determined jointly by the strategic choices of all
previous and future sellers, the relative positions of the two demand curves corresponding to
the same seller in either regime is a priori unclear. Therefore, the above elementary intuition
is not enough given the subtleties of our problem. We show that a relatively benign regularity
condition on the buyer’s type distribution—increasing hazard rate—pins down the relative
positions of the demand curves and therefore allows an unambiguous comparison of prices in
the two regimes.
We next explore which regime leads to a larger delay in trade. Delay in the context of the
bargaining model is related to the quantity traded in the analogous dynamic monopoly model
with larger quantities corresponding to smaller delay. Typically, a less elastic demand curve
implies a higher price, but, as is well-understood in demand theory, elasticities alone do not
determine the ranking of quantities. One needs to uncover additional details about the demand
functions, which are endogenous equilibrium objects in our model. In spite of this, we are
able to show that transparency entails more inefficient delay if the buyer’s type distribution is
concave.
Our contribution is not limited to the comparison of the two regimes. Even though the
transparent regime in isolation is the focus of the Coase bargaining and durable goods monopoly
literature, the equilibrium characterization of the non-transparent regime is novel to this paper.
Remarkably, we are able to show that the equilibrium outcome in the non-transparent regime is
unique and is necessarily in pure strategies under the minimal assumption of increasing virtual
valuation. This result, which does not call forth any genericity assumption, is in sharp contrast
to the classic results of Coase bargaining where offers are publicly observable, in which case,
randomization in the first period and off the equilibrium path may be necessary (see Fudenberg,
Levine, and Tirole (1985) and Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere (2002)). This pure strategy
property is also surprising in view of the results pertaining to dynamic markets for lemons with
unobservable offers where randomization is a generic property (see Ho¨rner and Vieille (2009),
and a concurrent paper by Fuchs, O¨ry, and Skrzypacz (2012)). This equilibrium property allows
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for a characterization of the role of transparency that is not possible elsewhere.
Related Literature
The role of observability has been previously investigated in different environments. Bagwell
(1995) studies the connection between commitment power and observability and shows that the
first-mover’s advantage could be eliminated if its action is not perfectly observed. Rubinstein
and Wolinsky (1990) study random matching and bargaining. In their complete information
environment, observability enlarges the equilibrium set by a folk theorem argument that is
not at work in the presence of incomplete information. Swinkels (1999) analyzes a dynamic
Spencian signalling model and obtains pooling equilibrium under private offers; No¨ldeke and
van Damme (1990) previously obtained Riley outcome in the case of public offers.
Whereas we look at the more standard setup with independent valuations, another line of
the literature studies bargaining with interdependent values; see the pioneering work by Evans
(1989), Vincent (1989), and Deneckere and Liang (2006). More recently, Ho¨rner and Vieille
(2009) study an interdependent-value model with a single long-run player and a sequence of
short-run buyers. They show that in the hidden-offer case, multiple equilibria exist, all in
mixed strategies, and trade occurs with a delay even when the discount factor goes to 1, while
in the public-offer case, remarkably, trade can only occur in the first period and an inefficient
impasse ensues. The question about the impact of price transparency on surplus division and
the timing of trade for general discount factors is not addressed, and they do not obtain a
clear-cut comparison of the two regimes in terms of price paths and long-run player’s welfare.
It is noteworthy that our independent value model is not a limiting case of theirs, and hence,
the qualitative divergence of results in terms of equilibrium structure, efficiency, and price
comparisons, should come as no surprise and it illustrates the subtle role of the interdependent
value assumption.2 In a random matching model, Kim (2012) presents a case in which efficiency
of trade may not be monotonic in the search friction.
In our model, efficiency is always obtained when discounting friction vanishes. We em-
phasize that bilateral sequential bargaining, rather than other centralized mechanisms, is an
appropriate model for thin markets in which trading opportunities do not arise frequently and
hence discounting frictions are non-negligible. Accordingly we focus on a comparison of price
dynamics, surplus division and the timing of trade in the two regimes that is robust to all dis-
counting frictions, and this task requires new methods. We obtain an unambiguous comparison
2The results of Ho¨rner and Vieille (2009) rely crucially on the assumption that buyer-seller types are suffi-
ciently interdependent and the discount factor is sufficiently large. Indeed, as the interdependence vanishes (i.e.,
the values of the uninformed short-run players become a constant), the lower bound required for the discount
factor converges to 1, implying that the limiting case is not a well-defined Coasian bargaining game.
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and show that the long-run buyer has a clear-cut preference over market information structures.
Several bargaining models that feature discounting as a source of search friction are similar
in structure to our model. Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1987) consider bargaining games
where a seller can decide whether to switch to a new buyer or continue to bargain with an
incumbent buyer. They show that a take-it-or-leave-it offer endogenously emerges as an equi-
librium outcome. Atakan (2008) studies bargaining situations where small parties can form a
coalition to bargain with a common opponent; see also Segal (2003).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the formal model, Section 3 considers
a two-period example to demonstrate the forces driving our results, Section 4 establishes the
existence and the uniqueness of equilibrium for the non-transparent regime, Sections 5 and 6
present our results concerning the comparison of prices and speed of trade across two regimes,
and Section 7 concludes. All omitted proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
A long-run buyer bargains with a sequence of short-run sellers. In each period t = 1, 2, ..., a
new seller enters the game. We refer to the seller at period t as “seller t.” Each seller has one
unit to sell for which his reservation value is normalized to 0. The buyer has demand for one
unit.
The buyer discounts future payoffs at rate δ ∈ (0, 1) and has private information about his
valuation, v, which we refer to as his “type.” The prior cumulative distribution of buyer types
is F , which has support [v, v¯], with v¯ > v > 0, and admits density f .3 We assume that there
exists a constant m > 0 such that 1
m
< f (v) < m for any v ∈ [v, v¯] . Throughout, we assume
that F has increasing “virtual valuation”; that is,
v − 1− F (v)
f (v)
is increasing. (1)
This assumption is standard in the mechanism design literature. Bulow and Roberts (1989)
point out that this assumption is equivalent to the monotonicity of the marginal revenue curve
of a monopolist seller facing buyers with type distribution F.
The bargaining within each period t is as follows: Seller t proposes a price pt to the buyer.
The buyer may choose to accept or reject this offer. If the price is accepted, the transaction
takes place at this price and the bargaining game ends; the buyer obtains a payoff of δt−1(v−pt),
while seller t obtains a payoff of pt. If the price is turned down, seller t leaves the market, and
the game proceeds to period t+ 1.
3That is, we focus on the so-called gap case. Please see Section 7 for a discussion of the role of this assumption.
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The bargaining is prolonged only when previous prices are rejected. We refer to the infor-
mation structure of the game where past rejected offers are observable (respectively, unobserv-
able) to the subsequent sellers as the “transparent regime” (respectively, the “non-transparent
regime”).
We consider the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the two specifications of the bargaining game.
The first thing to notice is that in both regimes, the “skimming property” is satisfied. That
is, after any history, on or off the equilibrium path, if a price offer p is accepted by a type v,
then it is also accepted by all types v′ > v. This allows us to cast the problem of each seller as
that of choosing a cutoff type k to trade with (or a probability of trade) rather than choosing
a price.4
In the equivalent dynamic monopoly interpretation of the model in the spirit of Gul, Sonnen-
schein, and Wilson (1986), a sequence of sellers, each with unlimited supplies, face a continuum
of long-run buyers distributed over [v, v¯] . Each seller could serve a fraction of the market at
some transaction price. The game is prolonged because the market is not fully penetrated,
not because all previous prices are rejected (in each period some prices could be offered and
accepted).
3 An Example
We first consider a two-period version of our model. For further simplicity, we assume that
buyer types are uniformly distributed with support [0, 1].5
By the skimming property, for each on or off-the-equilibrium-path history, there exists k1
such that seller 2 believes that buyer types higher than k1 trade with seller 1 and the remaining
types are [0, k1] . Since the second period is the final period, regardless of the regime, a remaining
buyer type k accepts seller 2’s offer p2 if p2 is below k. Therefore, seller 2’s problem in either















4See, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 406). The proof for the skimming property does not rely on the
assumption of observability; the crucial elements are price posting by the seller and single-unit demand by the
buyer. In the non-transparent regime, it can be shown that the buyer uses a reservation price strategy, which
is stronger than the skimming property.
5Even though in our general model we assume v > 0, with finite horizon the specification of v = 0 does not
affect the qualitative results, yet it simplifies the computation.
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The two regimes differ in the formation of beliefs off the equilibrium path: whereas an off-
path price of seller 1 in the non-transparent regime does not affect the belief of seller 2, who
cannot observe this deviation, it does so in the transparent regime. To be more specific, in
the non-transparent regime, seller 2 believes that the highest remaining buyer type is a fixed
constant k∗1, even when the actual cutoff of seller 1 is different. Therefore seller 2’s price in the
second period is a fixed constant equal to
k∗1
2
. If seller 1 wishes to sell to types [k, 1], the highest
price he can charge is





This is the price that makes the marginal type k indifferent between buying at a price p1 (k)
now and waiting until the second period for the constant price
k∗1
2
. Hence, seller 1 in the non-









































In contrast, in the transparent regime, if seller 1 sells to buyer types [k, 1] for any k, seller
2 will correctly anticipate the remaining types to be [0, k] and charge a price k
2
accordingly.
Moreover, seller 2’s response of setting price k
2
to seller 1’s deviation is fully anticipated by the
buyer, implying that the highest price that seller 1 can charge and sell to buyer types [k, 1] is
























We summarize our finding in Table 1 below.





































Table 1: Comparison of the two regimes
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The surprising contrast becomes more apparent if we take δ → 1 as illustrated in Table 2
below.
period 1 cutoff period 2 cutoff period 1 price period 2 price









Table 2: Comparison of the two regimes as δ → 1
This example illustrates the following qualitative results that we generalize later. The prices
are uniformly higher in the transparent regime, and hence, the lack of transparency diverts
more surplus to the informed long-run buyer. In addition, the expected delay in trade; i.e.,
the expected value of 1− δτ(k) where τ(k) is the period in which type k trades is higher in the
non-transparent regime, and hence, the lack of transparency fosters efficiency.
4 Equilibrium
The analysis of the transparent regime follows from Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985)
and Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986). Their results in fact apply to two bargainers with
unequal discount factors – including the case in our sequential search model, where the sequence
of short-run sellers can effectively be thought of as one seller with discount factor equal to 0.6
We now turn to the more interesting non-transparent regime. We establish that there is a
unique equilibrium that is in pure strategies in this regime.
Theorem 1 Fix any δ ∈ (0, 1) . The equilibrium in the non-transparent regime exists and is
unique. In addition, there exists 0 < T <∞, such that all buyer types trade with probability 1
within T periods, and all players use pure strategies at or before period T.
This result is in contrast with existing results in two strands of the literature. In Coasian bar-
gaining models, uniqueness is established under a genericity condition; moreover, randomization
is often required off the equilibrium path: pure strategy equilibria have not been established ex-
cept for specific examples that allow for closed-form solutions, such as the uniform distribution
we analyzed in the example above; see, e.g., Stokey (1981) and Sobel and Takahashi (1983).7
6It is known in this literature that the equilibrium is unique for generic type distributions, and trade takes
place with probability 1 within a finite number of periods. In addition, even though in this regime the equilibrium
need not be in pure strategies, on the equilibrium path randomization can occur only in the first period. However,
when characterizing off-equilibrium play, randomization could be necessary even with short-run sellers.
7Note that when seller T + 1 is approached by the buyer, the seller’s belief could be arbitrary in a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, and hence multiple off-path play could be supported in period T + 1. However, this does
not affect the equilibrium outcome. The Coasian bargaining literature does not consider this kind of multiplicity
of off-path play.
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In bargaining models with interdependent values, typically no pure strategy equilibrium exists;
see, e.g., Ho¨rner and Vieille (2009).
The unobservability of price history entails two competing effects that are absent in the
transparent regime. On the one hand, the skimming property implies only that the posterior
beliefs are distributions over right truncations of the prior—instead of simple right truncations
of the prior, as would be the case if the history were observable. This is simply because the
outcomes of potential randomizations by previous sellers are not observable (except trivially
in the first period when there is no prior randomization). On the other hand, if the posterior
beliefs were indeed simple right truncations of the prior, our assumption of increasing virtual
valuation (or equivalently, the decreasing marginal revenue property) would imply that each
seller has a unique optimal pure strategy in the non-transparent regime, since in this regime the
“inverse demand curve” faced by the analogous monopolist is simply a linear transformation
of 1− F . This is in contrast to the transparent regime, where the demand faced by each seller
must take into account the reaction of subsequent sellers, which depends on the details of F .
Therefore, the crux of our proofs for pure strategy and uniqueness is to show that the posterior
beliefs, even when price history is not observable, are necessarily simple right truncations of
the prior.
The complete proof for Theorem 1 in Appendix A is quite involved. Our idea of establishing
pure strategy is to successively narrow down the supports of mixed strategies, which we believe
is interesting and may be of use elsewhere. We offer a brief outline of our proof for interested
readers. Fix an equilibrium and let T be the last period in which trade occurs with a positive
probability in that equilibrium.8 As mentioned above, by the skimming property, we can
identify seller t’s offer pt in period t with the marginal buyer type kt, the lowest type that will
accept the price pt. Since seller t can play mixed strategies, the marginal types can be random
as well. Let Kt denote the support of marginal types in seller t’s randomization. In the fixed
equilibrium of the non-transparent regime, Kt only depends on the calendar time t, not on the
realizations of previous price offers. Write k¯t = supKt as the supremum of the support of seller





that all equilibrium strategies at or before T must be pure. The next lemma is the critical step
toward establishing this result.





Proof: See Appendix A.2.










Figure 1: Kt is the support of seller t’s randomization. Lemma 1 implies that K1 does not intersect with
[k¯2, k¯1), and hence, the support of seller 1’s randomization is narrowed down.
Figure 1 illustrates the content of this lemma for τ = 1. The lemma establishes that, for
any t < T , all but the highest cutoff types in the support of seller t’s randomization are smaller
than the supremum of the support of seller T ’s randomization, k¯T . Then, since all trade must
take place in T periods, and hence k¯T = v, there are no cutoffs but k¯t in the support of seller
t’s randomization, which completes the argument for the pure strategy.
In a pure strategy equilibrium, the posterior type distribution must always be a truncation




(F (k)− F (k′)) [(1− δ)k′ + δp] .
The assumption of increasing virtual valuation guarantees that whenever the continuation equi-
librium price p is less than k, there is a unique solution k′ to the seller’s problem. In contrast,
in the transparent regime, since the continuation price p depends on today’s choice k′, the
uniqueness of the solution to the seller’s profit-maximization problem is not guaranteed. This
distinction allows us to establish the uniqueness of equilibrium in the non-transparent regime,
in contrast to the transparent regime.
5 Price Comparison
In this section we make the stronger assumption that F exhibits an increasing hazard rate; i.e.,
f(v)
1−F (v) is non-decreasing over [v, v¯] . This assumption is introduced into the bargaining setup by
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Ausubel and Deneckere (1993), and we uncover a crucial connection between this assumption
and demand theory. Under this assumption, we establish that any equilibrium realization of
the price sequence in the transparent regime is uniformly above that in the non-transparent
regime.
Let i = TR,NTR indicate the transparent and non-transparent regimes, respectively. We
let {pit} represent a realized equilibrium price sequence in regime i and let T i be the last period
in which the trade takes place with positive probability along this equilibrium path. The price
comparison will not be well-defined if T TR 6= TNTR. To overcome this, we adopt the convention
that pit = v for t > T
i.
Theorem 2 Fix any δ ∈ (0, 1) . Suppose that F exhibits an increasing hazard rate. Let {pTRt }
be any realization of the equilibrium price sequence in the transparent regime, and let {pNTRt }
be the unique equilibrium price sequence in the non-transparent regime. Then pTRt ≥ pNTRt for
all t.
The complete proof is relegated to Appendix B. Here we provide an outline to help readers
navigate through the proof and explain how the increasing hazard rate assumption is used.
First note that the result will be vacuously true if the buyer type distribution F is such that in
either regime all trade takes place within the first period, in which case the transaction prices
are identically v, the lowest buyer type. So suppose this is not the case. We first show that
the ranking holds for the first period, i.e., pTR1 ≥ pNTR1 .9 The crucial intuition is discerned by
comparing the “demand curves” that seller 1 in either regime faces.
Our proof amounts to showing that the demand curve in the non-transparent regime is
more elastic than that in the transparent regime at pTR1 – the equilibrium price offer of the
transparent regime. Then, it follows from the elementary monopoly-pricing theory that the
first-period profit-maximizing price in the non-transparent regime is lower than pTR1 .
Let pTR2 (p) be the equilibrium second period price in the transparent regime, as a function
of the first period price p.10 Then, for any first period price p, the cutoff buyer types who
purchase in the first period in the two regimes – kTR1 (p) and k
NTR
1 (p) – are determined by the
following indifference conditions:
p = (1− δ)kTR1 (p) + δpTR2 (p) (5)
9However, note that after the first period, the posterior belief in the two regimes might be different. Hence
the price ranking from period 2 on is not immediate. See Appendix B.2, Lemma 15 for the complete argument.
10Here, in order to give a clean intuition, we have focused on the case where all sellers make pure strategy price
offers after any history. As discussed previously, this may not be the case in an equilibrium of the transparent
regime. The Appendix B deals with the general case.
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and
p = (1− δ)kNTR1 (p) + δpNTR2 (6)
which can be re-arranged, respectively as follows:
kTR1 (p) =
p− δpTR2 (p)





As we explained earlier, seller 1’s problem in either regime can be thought of as the problem
of a monopolist who faces a demand curve that is shaped by the strategies of the subsequent
sellers, by identifying the probability of trade with the quantity sold. In other words, by letting
Q = 1− F (k) stand for the quantity sold, the above indifference conditions can be interpreted
as the inverse demand curves faced by seller 1 in either regime. Then the key is to compare the
following two demand curves faced by seller 1 in the two regimes:
QTR(p) = 1− F (kTR1 (p))
and
QNTR(p) = 1− F (kNTR1 (p)).
Letting pi1 represent the first period equilibrium price in regime i, and assuming for the
purpose of contradiction that pTR1 < p
NTR







that is, the percentage decline in the quantity sold in response to a price increase from pTR1 to
pNTR1 is smaller in the transparent regime than in the non-transparent regime. Our argument
has three steps.
First, note that
∆NTR ≡ kNTR1 (pNTR1 )− kNTR1 (pTR1 ) ≥ kTR1 (pNTR1 )− kTR1 (pTR1 ) ≡ ∆TR, (9)
that is, the size of the interval of types purchasing in the first period shrinks more in the
non-transparent regime than in the transparent regime following a price increase from pTR1 to
pNTR1 . This simply follows from (7) and the fact that the second period price in the transparent
regime, pTR2 (p), is non-decreasing in the first period price p.
11 Intuitively, this is because any
price change by seller 1 in the transparent regime elicits a response by seller 2 in the form of
a price change in the same direction, which is anticipated by the buyer. In particular, a price
11This intuitive assertion does require a proof: it follows because the first period marginal type is non-
decreasing in the first period price (Lemma 11 in the Appendix) and the second period price is non-decreasing
in the first period marginal type (Lemma 10 in the Appendix).
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increase in the transparent regime implies higher prices in ensuing periods, so that, following
such an increase, a smaller range of types switch from buying to not buying when compared
with the case of the non-transparent regime – where a price change cannot be matched by the
ensuing sellers.
Second, we posit that
kTR1 (p
TR
1 ) ≤ kNTR1 (pTR1 ), (10)
or equivalently, QTR(pTR1 ) ≥ QNTR1 (pTR1 ). In words, the monopolist corresponding to the trans-
parent regime sells more at price pTR1 than would the monopolist corresponding to the non-
transparent regime.12
Third, we note that the increasing hazard rate property of the type distribution F implies
that the quantity F (k+∆)−F (k)
1−F (k) is increasing in k. This quantity is also increasing in ∆ by the




F (ki(pTR1 ) + ∆
i)− F (ki1(pTR1 ))
1− F (ki1(pTR1 ))
, i = TR,NTR, (11)
where ∆i is defined in (9). Then (8) follows because ∆TR ≤ ∆NTR (by (9)) and kTR1 (pTR1 ) ≤
kNTR1 (p
TR













Figure 2: The role of the increasing hazard rate assumption.
Figure 2 depicts the mapping between the price choice and the marginal type who would
choose to trade at that price for each regime. The distinction of having observable versus
12Our argument for this assertion requires the use of induction. Intuitively, if the second period equilibrium
prices in the transparent regime are higher than those in the non-transparent regime (Lemma 13 in the Ap-
pendix), then, since in either regime the first period price is simply a weighted average of the marginal type
who buys at that price and the second period price (see (5), (6)), the marginal type that buys at price pTR1 is
larger in the non-transparent regime.
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unobservable prices guarantees that ∆NTR is greater than ∆TR. However, since the intervals
[ki1(p
NTR
1 )− ki1(pTR1 )], i = TR,NTR, are in general not nested, their relative measure under F
cannot be ranked. The increasing hazard rate property guarantees that this measure relative
to the measure of [v, ki1(p
NTR
1 )] is larger in the non-transparent regime.
To summarize, (8) means that the percentage change in quantity in response to a given
price change (from pTR1 to p
NTR
1 ) is larger in the non-transparent regime: i.e., at this range of
prices, the demand curve faced by the monopolist in the non-transparent regime is more elastic.
Nevertheless, this monopolist strictly prefers the higher price pNTR1 to the lower price p
TR
1 , since
pNTR1 is the unique solution to his profit maximization problem. Then, the monopolist in the
transparent regime, facing a less elastic demand, should also have the same preference over
these two prices, which contradicts the optimality of pTR1 . This establishes that p
TR
1 ≥ pNTR1 .
Since the price paths in the two regimes that the long-run buyer faces are uniformly ranked,
it follows immediately that the buyer has a clear-cut preference over the two regimes.
Corollary 1 Fix any δ ∈ (0, 1) . Suppose that F exhibits an increasing hazard rate. Then the
long-run buyer is better off in the non-transparent regime.
6 Expected Delay
As is well-understood in Coasian dynamics, as the buyer becomes extremely patient, the out-
come becomes efficient. However, the literature so far has little to say about the delay and
efficiency when δ is bounded away from 1. Instead, the literature has focused on the limiting
case of δ → 1 to study “real delay” in various environments. Studying the equilibrium outcomes
in the limiting case is not only conceptually important to our understanding of commitment
power but also facilitates definite conclusions, such as the limiting efficiency result for the gap
case. However, to understand fully the applications in the real market environments, it is neces-
sary to also consider discount factors that are bounded away from 1. This section is concerned
with the question of which regime leads to a longer delay in trade for any buyer discount factor
δ ∈ (0, 1) .
Under our interpretation, which identifies the probability of sale with the quantity sold by a
residual monopolist, the expected delay in sale is smaller if the sales are more “front-loaded”—
i.e., if earlier sellers cover a larger share of the market. In the example of Section 3, comparison
of the two regimes in this dimension was immediate from the fact that the first seller in the
non-transparent regime serves a larger share of the market (targets a smaller cutoff type). In
the general model, however, the comparison of quantities sold by seller 1—or subsequent sellers,
for that matter—in the two regimes is not possible and should not be expected. This is because
demand curves faced by seller 1 in either regime typically are related to each other in the
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manner shown in Figure 3. Therefore, even though the ranking of the elasticities is possible,
it only implies that seller 1 in the transparent regime chooses a price above pNTR1 , and not
necessarily above p¯. Nevertheless, we are able to establish the result for the general model
under the additional assumption that the buyer type-distribution is concave.
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Figure 3: Representative demand curves of seller 1 for the infinite horizon model. Note that the two demand
curves intersect at a price lower than the first period equilibrium price of the unobservable regime. This is
because when the horizon is longer than two periods, the game starting in the second period onward is no
longer identical across the two regimes.
To formally state our result, let {kTRt } be a realization of equilibrium cutoff levels in the
transparent regime and let {kNTRt } be the unique equilibrium cutoff sequence in the non-
transparent regime with the convention that kit = v for t > T
i where T i is the last period such
that trade takes place with positive probability along the realized path. Given these sequences,
for each type v < v¯, and for either i = NTR, TR, there is a unique t, such that kit > v ≥ kit+1,
with the convention that ki0 = v¯. Let t
i(k) represent this t.
Then, a measure of the delay that type v experiences is 1− δti(v), which is the portion of the
payoff lost due to the delay in reaching an agreement. Therefore, the expected delay in regime
i = TR,NTR is ∫ v¯
v





Notice that ex ante, the probability that the trade will take place at period t is F (kit−1)−F (kit).











Theorem 3 Fix any δ ∈ (0, 1) . Assume that pTRt ≥ pNTRt for any t where {pTRt } is any
realization of equilibrium prices in the transparent regime and {pNTRt } is the unique equilibrium
sequence of prices in the non-transparent regime. Then, for concave F , the expected delay in
the transparent regime is larger than the expected delay in the non-transparent regime.
Proof: See Appendix C.
To gain some intuition into how the ranking of prices helps and what role the concavity of
type distribution F plays, note that for each i = TR,NTR, we have13
pTRt = (1− δ)
∞∑
l=t






In words, the discounted sum of the tails of the cutoff sequence from period t on (which is equal
to the price in that period) is larger for the transparent regime than for the non-transparent
regime. It is clear that when F is applied to each kit to obtain the expression for the expected
delay in (12), this ranking need not be preserved. The substance of Theorem 3 is to show that
this ranking is preserved when F is concave. The intuition can most easily be gleaned from the
following thought experiment: suppose in each regime trade takes place in the second period
at the latest. Then, (13) implies that
(1− δ)kNTR1 + δkNTR2 ≤ (1− δ)kTR1 + δkTR2 and kNTR2 ≤ kTR2 .
This means that one of the following two rankings must hold:
1. kNTR1 ≤ kTR1 and kNTR2 ≤ kTR2 ;
2. kNTR1 > k
TR
1 ≥ kTR2 ≥ kNTR2 .
If the ranking in 1 obtains, (12) follows immediately from the monotonicity of F without
referring to concavity. Under the ranking in 2, the cutoffs in the transparent regime are “less
spread-out”—as well as on average higher—than those in the non-transparent regime, which
13That the prices are discounted sums of the cutoff types follows from the cutoff buyer type’s indifference
condition
pit = (1− δ)kit + δpit+1
for i = TR,NTR. Also since we are only concerned with equilibrium path cutoff types, even in the observable
regime, future cutoffs (and therefore prices) are deterministic.
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implies that, evaluated under a concave and increasing function F , their expectation will be
larger.
To see how this intuition is generalized to longer horizons, consider an alternative interpre-
tation of our model as a bargaining game with a stochastic deadline: suppose that δ, instead
of representing the discount factor of the buyer, represents the probability with which the bar-
gaining ends before the next period, conditional on the fact that it has not so far ended. It is
well-understood that such a game is strategically equivalent to the game we have analyzed so
far. Then, “the smallest buyer type that gets to trade” in either regime is a random variable
assigning probability δt−1 to kit. If the realization of this random variable is k, then the realized
probability (or quantity) of sale is 1 − F (k). With this interpretation, 1 minus the expression
in (12) is the expected quantity sold or equivalently the expected probability of sale in either
regime. What (13) allows us to show is that the random variable determining the smallest
buyer type that trades in the transparent regime second order stochastically dominates its non-
transparent regime counterpart. That is why the expectation of this random variable evaluated
at concave F is larger in the transparent regime, implying a lower expected probability of trade
or, equivalently, higher expected delay when past rejected prices are observable.
7 Concluding Remarks
To conclude, we emphasize several aspects of our model that we feel deserve further elaboration.
We can draw parallels between our model and well-known models of oligopoly. In particular,
the bargaining model where previous prices are observable to future sellers is reminiscent of
the “Stackelberg competition” in oligopoly, as later sellers observe and react to choices that
earlier sellers have “committed to.” The non-transparent regime instead is suggestive of the
“Cournot competition” because each seller makes a choice without observing the choices of
any other seller. However, the analogy is not complete because of two distinctions: first, our
sellers compete in prices, which are strategic complements, rather than in quantities, which are
strategic substitutes. Second, unlike in the standard theory of homogeneous good oligopolies,
the products sold by different sellers in our model are vertically differentiated. The reason is
that, in either regime, for a given price, each type of buyer prefers to buy from an earlier seller
rather than wait for a later seller because of discounting. This wedge created by discounting
would be analogous to the specification of vertically differentiated products with earlier sellers
in the bargaining model corresponding to the sellers of a higher quality product in an anal-
ogous oligopoly model. Then the comparison of the outcomes of the bargaining games with
observable versus unobservable price histories is analogous to the comparison of the outcomes of
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sequential versus simultaneous price (or quantity) setting in an oligopoly market with vertically
differentiated products.
Another “competitive” benchmark with which we can contrast the performance of the two
regimes is one where there is “within-period competition” between the short-run sellers; i.e., the
buyer meets two (or more) sellers each period and price is determined by competitive bidding. In
this case, it is easy to see that the prices will immediately be zero in either regime. Therefore,
our results suggest that the non-transparent regime leads to outcomes that are “closer” to
this benchmark. Rather than studying within-period competitive bidding, which would more
reasonably describe a “thick” market, our purpose in studying one-to-one bargaining is precisely
to unlock the strategic aspect of price formation.
Our bargaining model corresponds to the “gap” case—well-known in the bargaining litera-
ture. In fact, the Coase conjecture fails in the no-gap case with short-run sellers: We can employ
the insights of Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) to construct multiple non-stationary equilibria,
where the long-run buyer builds a “reputation” for having a low willingness to pay. Neverthe-
less, the gap case captures cleanly the critical insights of imperfect competition by silencing the
reputation effect.
Our model features one-sided incomplete information and the uninformed party making
offers. An interesting research direction is to see the role of price transparency in bargaining
environments with two-sided uncertainty and bilateral offers. The major complication is of
course the signalling aspect; see, for example, Cramton (1984), Chatterjee and Samuelson
(1987), and Abreu and Gul (2000).
Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 1
A.1 Preliminary Results
In our dynamic environment, the distribution of types varies over time. We first make an
observation regarding an implication of the monotone virtual valuation property for truncated
distributions.
Lemma 2 Assume F has an increasing virtual valuation: k − 1−F (k)
f(k)
is strictly increasing.
Then k − α−F (k)
f(k)
is strictly increasing in k whenever F (k) < α ≤ 1.
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Proof: Consider k′ < k and F (k) < α. We want to show
k − α− F (k)
f(k)





L (α) = k − k′ + F (k)− F (k
′)
f(k′)








(14) is equivalent to L (α) > 0. Notice that L (1) > 0 since F has increasing virtual valuation.
For α < 1, we have two cases to consider: if 1
f(k)
− 1
f(k′) ≤ 0, then L (α) > 0 follows immediately
by the definition of L (α) ; if 1
f(k)
− 1
f(k′) > 0, then L (α) is decreasing in α, and hence L (α) >
L (1) > 0.
By virtue of the “skimming property,”we shall identify price p with the infimum buyer type
who accepts p. Since the seller in period t could potentially randomize, let Kt be the support
of the cutoffs in period t and write K = ∪Tt=1Kt. For each t, let k¯t = supKt and k¯ t = inf Kt.
Hence after period t, the largest possible interval of remaining types is [v, k¯t), while the smallest




t = supKt\{k¯t}. By convention, sup∅ = −∞. Therefore, [v, k¯′t)
is the second largest possible interval after a (potential) seller randomization in period t. Note
that it is possible a priori that k¯′t = k¯t. By standard arguments, kt ≥ v for any t, and in any
equilibrium, the game ends in finite time with a price equal to v. This is formalized in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 In any equilibrium of the non-transparent regime, there exists T > 0 such that trade
takes place with probability 1 within T periods.
Proof: Step 1: Note that a seller never makes a price offer below v. The argument is standard:
all buyer types will accept a price of (1− δ) v, which is better than waiting for a price of 0
tomorrow; but then
(
1− δ2) v will be accepted for sure because the best price tomorrow will
be (1− δ) v; iterating this argument shows that a seller will never make a price offer below
(1− δn) v for any n, and the claim follows.
Step 2: Suppose to the contrary there is an equilibrium in which some positive measure of
types never trade for some history. Then in this equilibrium, kt > v for any t > 0. Clearly,{
kt
}
is a decreasing and hence convergent sequence. Consequently,
∣∣kt − kt+1∣∣ → 0. Thus,
the profit of seller t converges to 0 as t → ∞. Moreover, it must be that kt ↓ v because if
limt→∞ kt = k∗ > v, then any seller could deviate to charge a price v, which, by the previous
claim, guarantees a strictly positive profit (F (k∗)− F (v)) v, a contradiction.
Step 3: Now from Step 2, for each ε > 0, there exists t such that v < kt < v + ε. Then we
claim that there exists ε such that for any k ∈ (v, v + ε) and any k′ ∈ (v, k],
(F (k)− F (k′)) k′ < F (k) v. (15)
20
To see this, note that the left-hand side is differentiable in k′, and its derivative is −f (k′) k′ +
F (k)− F (k′) . Note that
−f (k′) k′ + F (k)− F (k′) < − 1
m
v + F (k)− F (k′)
< − 1
m




Hence, when ε < 1
m2
v, −f (k′) k′ + F (k)− F (k′) < 0, and (15) follows immediately.
Step 4: Notice that the left-hand side of (15) is the highest possible payoff a seller could
obtain when facing buyer types [v, k] if he wants to sell to the types [k′, k] (it assumes that
a price equal to k′ will be accepted by all types above k′), while the right-hand side of (15) ,
by Step 1, is the seller’s exact payoff by making a price offer v. Therefore, (15) implies that if
kt < v +
1
m2
v, it is an ex post strictly dominant strategy for seller t + 1 to make a price offer
equal to v for each realization of kt ∈ (v, kt]. Therefore, kt+1 = v is an ex-ante strictly dominant
strategy for seller t as long as v < kt < v+
1
m2
v. This contradicts the supposition that kt+1 > v
for each t.
We next argue that the upper bound of the support of a seller’s potential randomization is
strictly decreasing over time periods during which trade takes place with positive probability.
Lemma 4 In any equilibrium in which the game ends for sure at T, we have v¯ > k¯t > k¯t+1 for
any t < T.
Proof: If k¯t ≤ k¯t+1, then seller t+ 1 gets 0 profit. He could get positive profit by charging v.
Moreover, if k¯t = v¯, then seller t can charge v and get a strictly higher profit.
A.2 Pure Strategy: Proof of Lemma 1









Proof: To prove this claim, note that by the definition of k¯2, the buyer type k ∈ [k¯2, k¯1] is
guaranteed to trade at or before period 2. Therefore, by choosing a marginal type k ∈ [k¯2, k¯1],
seller 1 would sell with probability 1−F (k) . The price p1(k) is such that the marginal type k,
who will buy for sure next period, is indifferent between buying now or waiting:
k − p1(k) = δ (k − E [p2]) .
Hence, p1(k) = (1− δ)k + δE [p2] and therefore seller 1’s problem is
max
k
(1− F (k))× [(1− δ)k + δE [p2]].
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Since k − 1−F (k)
f(k)





. Now since k¯1 maximizes seller 1’s profit (or types arbitrarily close to k¯1 if
k¯1 = supK1 is not achieved by any k ∈ K1) and k¯1 is interior, it must be that at k = k¯1, this
derivative must be 0 and since it is is strictly increasing, it must be negative for any k ∈ [k¯2, k¯1).









Note that Lemma 5 does not imply that seller 1 must play a pure strategy. It does not rule
out the case that K1\
[
k¯2, k¯1
] 6= ∅. However, we are able to successively narrow down K1. This
is done in Lemma 1 of the main text.





Proof: The proof is by induction. We proceed in the following steps.








. This is what we proved in Lemma 5. This
step shows that k¯1 is an isolated point in K1.
Step 2: Next we argue that for 1 ≤ τ + 2 ≤ T, if





then (∪τ+1t=1Kt) ∩ [k¯τ+2, k¯1] = {k¯1, k¯2..., k¯τ+1}.
In words, we want to show inductively that k¯t is an isolated point in the support of seller
t’s cutoffs and no seller will ever set a cutoff in the interval (k¯t, k¯t+1). The induction step is
illustrated in Figure 4.




. Recall that k¯′t =
supKt\{k¯t}. Take the smallest t∗ such that k¯′t∗ = sup{k¯′t|t = 1, ..., τ + 1}. That is, k¯′t∗ is the
highest among the “second highest equilibrium cutoffs” in periods up to τ + 1. Note that by
the induction hypothesis for any t ≤ τ ,
k¯′t∗ ≤ k¯τ+1 < k¯t. (17)
If Kt\{k¯t} = ∅ for all t = 1, ..., τ + 1, then the proof is complete already. Suppose this is
not the case. If k¯′t∗ < k¯τ+2, then the induction is complete as well. Now suppose k¯
′
t∗ ≥ k¯τ+2.

































Figure 4: The left panel depicts the induction hypothesis; the right panel depicts the induction step.




K = ∅. That is, there is no (future
or past) cutoff immediately above k¯′t∗ . Hence, in any period t after any history, buyer types
[k¯′t∗ , k¯
′
t∗ + ε) must be either entirely in the support of the posterior or entirely outside of the
support of the posterior.
Proof of Claim 1: Note that by (17) , we have either k¯′t∗ = k¯τ+1 or k¯
′
t∗ < k¯τ+1. By (17) , in
the former case we have
k¯τ+2 < k¯
′
t∗ = k¯τ+1, (18)
and in the latter case, we have
k¯τ+2 ≤ k¯′t∗ < k¯τ+1. (19)
It follows immediately from Lemma 4 that there is no offer (buyer cutoff) within (k¯′t∗ , k¯
′
t∗ + ε)
in all periods t = 1, ..., T.
Claim 2: There exists ε > 0 such that (k¯t∗ − ε, k¯t∗ + ε)
⋂
K = {k¯t∗}. That is, there is no
(future or past) cutoff in an ε-neighborhood of k¯t∗ .
Proof of Claim 2: If t∗ ≤ τ , the claim follows from the induction hypothesis (16). If
t∗ = τ + 1, the problem arises only when k¯τ+1 = k¯′τ+1 because then k¯τ+1 is not an isolated
point. This means that there exists knτ+1 ↑ k¯τ+1. Then it must be that there exists t¯ < τ + 1
with equilibrium cutoffs knt¯ ∈ Kt¯ such that knt¯ ↑ k¯τ+1; otherwise, seller τ + 1 will not offer both
knτ+1 and k¯τ+1 following the same line of arguments in Step 1 that establishes Lemma 5. But
then we must have k¯ ′¯t = k¯
′
t∗ . Since t¯ < τ + 1 = t
∗, this contradicts the definition of t∗.
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Claim 3: k¯′t∗ 6= k¯t∗ . In addition, (k¯′t∗ , k¯t∗)
⋂
Kt = ∅ for all t ≤ t∗. That is, (k¯′t∗ , k¯t∗) includes
no past cutoffs.
Proof of Claim 3: First note that k¯′t∗ 6= k¯t∗ by Claim 2 above. The remaining part of Claim
3 follows from the induction hypothesis.
Claim 4: (k¯′t∗ , k¯t∗−1)
⋂
Kt = ∅ for all t < t∗. That is, at the beginning of period t∗, buyer
types (k¯′t∗ , k¯t∗−1) are either entirely in the support of the posterior or entirely outside of the
support of the posterior.
Proof of Claim 4: This follows from the induction hypothesis (16) and Claim 3.
From now on, we shall consider seller t∗’s optimization problem. For any buyer type k ≥ v,
let τ(k) be the (random) period at which type k ends up trading if he does not trade at or
before time t∗. The distribution of τ(k) for each k is determined by the equilibrium strategies
of sellers t > t∗.
Step 4: To target a cutoff type k, seller t∗ must choose a price p(k) satisfying the following
indifference condition:
k − p(k) =
∞∑
t=t∗+1
Pr(τ (k) = t)δt−t
∗
E [k − pt(kt)|kt ≤ k, kt ∈ Kt] . (20)
Using the fact that type k ≥ v must eventually trade in the future, the right-hand side of the






Pr(τ (k) = t)δt−t
∗





Pr(τ (k) = t)δt−t
∗





Hence p (k) and d (k) are type k’s expected discounted trading price and discounted trading
probability from period t∗ + 1 on, conditional on this type not having traded at or before t∗.
Hence, (20) can be rewritten as
k − p(k) = kd (k)− p (k) .
Therefore, the cutoff price for type k at period t∗ can be written as p (k) = k (1− d (k))+p(k).
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Step 5: We now consider seller t∗’s objective function. If seller t∗ targets a cutoff type
k ∈ [k¯′t∗ , k¯t∗−1), the trading probability can be written in the form of
β (α− F (k))
for some positive number α ∈ (F (k¯t∗−1) , 1] and β < 1. This follows from Claim 4 in Step
3: either all buyer types in the interval (k¯′t∗ , k¯t∗−1) have traded before t
∗ or none of them has
traded before t∗. Therefore, seller t∗’s payoff by choosing a cutoff k ∈ [k¯′t∗ , k¯t∗−1) is
R (k) = β (α− F (k)) [k (1− d (k)) + p(k)] . (21)
Moreover, by Claim 2 in Step 3, if types
(
k¯t∗ − ε, k¯t∗ + ε
)
do not trade at period t∗, they will
trade together in the future. Thus we have
d(k) ≡ d(k¯t∗) and p(k) ≡ p(k¯t∗) for all k ∈
(
k¯t∗ − ε, k¯t∗ + ε
)
.
By Claim 1 in Step 3, we have
d(k) ≡ d(k¯′t∗) and p(k) ≡ p(k¯′t∗) for all k ∈ [k¯′t∗ , k¯′t∗ + ε).
In sum, seller t∗’s payoff (21) as a function of k is such that
R (k) = β (α− F (k)) [k (1− d (k¯t∗))+ p(k¯t∗)] if k ∈ (k¯t∗ − ε, k¯t∗ + ε);
R (k) = β (α− F (k)) [k (1− d (k¯′t∗))+ p(k¯′t∗)] if k ∈ [k¯′t∗ , k¯′t∗ + ε).
Step 6: Now consider the derivative of seller t∗’s payoff with respect to k. In the case that















Note that in the case that k ∈ [k¯′t∗ , k¯′t∗ + ε), R (k) is right-differentiable in k. As a result,
























































= 0 (by (22)).
Note that the inequality in the previous display follows from (i) the fact that both p(k) and
d(k) are increasing in k; and (ii) the fact that






Fact (i) follows from the definition of p(k) and d(k). Fact (ii) follows from Lemma 2.





< 0. Hence k¯′t∗ /∈ Kt∗ . In particular, there exists












Now since k¯′t∗ /∈ Kt∗ , there exists a sequence knt∗ ∈ Kt∗ such that knt∗ ↑ k¯′t∗ . By skimming
property, a price acceptable by knt∗ is also acceptable by k¯
′
t∗ . As k
n
t∗ becomes arbitrarily close
to k¯′t∗ , the probability of sale from targeting k
n
t∗ becomes arbitrarily close to the probability of




















Hence, knt∗ cannot be optimal, a contradiction. This establishes that either Kt\{k¯t} = ∅ for all
t = 1, ..., τ + 1, or otherwise k¯′t∗ < k¯τ+2. The induction is therefore complete.
A.3 Existence and Uniqueness
Define the following function:
k(b, p) = arg max
k≥p
[F (b)− F (k)][(1− δ)k + δp]. (26)
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The solution to the maximization problem exists by the continuity of F and is unique by the
assumption that F satisfies increasing virtual valuation. Therefore, k(b, p) is a well-defined
function. Intuitively, k(b, p) is the current period marginal type that maximizes the seller’s
revenue given that the next period price is p and the highest type that has not traded so far is
b.
Lemma 6 (1) k(b, p) is continuous. (2) As long as k(b, p) > p, it is strictly increasing in b
and strictly decreasing in p.
Proof: (1) follows from the maximum theorem. (2) says that when the next period price
is higher, the current seller chooses a lower cutoff (sells to more buyer types) and when the
highest remaining type b is higher, he chooses a higher cutoff (sells to fewer types). Note that
the first-order condition is given by





and the claim follows.
Define the sequences b0, b1, ... and p0, p1, ..., inductively, as follows:
b0 = p0 = v;
bs = sup {b : k(b, ps−1) = bs−1} ;
ps = (1− δ)bs + δps−1.
Intuitively, we have reversed the timeline for the purpose of backward induction. When the
game is over, period 0, the largest remaining type is b0 = v and the price that leads to b0 = v
(in the previous period) is p0 = v. Now b1 is the largest type such that the game will finish
this period if the remaining set of types is [v, b1] . Then p1 is the price that leads to b1 (in the
previous period). Hence, if the remaining set of types is [v, bs], the game will finish in s periods
(including the current period), and ps is the price that leads to the marginal type bs (in the
previous period).
Given (bs−1, ps−1) and bs−1 ≥ ps−1, bs is (and therefore ps is) uniquely defined. However, we
cannot remove “sup” because if bs−1 = ps−1, then any b ∈ (bs−1, bs] satisfies (26) .
Lemma 7 The set {b : k(b, ps−1) = bs−1} is a singleton whenever bs−1 > ps−1.
Lemma 8 (Existence) For each initial belief b ∈ (bs, bs+1], there is an equilibrium that ends in
exactly s+ 1 periods.
Proof: By definition of b1, there is an equilibrium in which the game ends in 1 period if the
initial belief is in (b0, b1]. This establishes the claim for s = 0. Now we construct an equilibrium
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for s > 1. For each b ∈ (b0, b1], set β0(b) = b and pi0(b) = v and for n = 1, ..., s, define
pin, βn : (b0, b1]→ R, inductively, by the following:
pin(b) = (1− δ)βn−1(b) + δpin−1(b) and k(βn(b), pin−1(b)) = βn−1(b).
Now we claim that βn, pin satisfy the following properties:
(1) βn(b) is strictly increasing and continuous,
(2) βn(b) > pin−1(b),
(3) pin(b) is continuous and weakly increasing,
(4) βn(b0) = bn and βn(b1) = bn+1.
First, we argue that (1)-(4) hold for n = 1. Since b > b0 = pi0(b), by Lemma 6, β1(b) is
strictly increasing and continuous, establishing property (1). Property (4) follows by definition
of the sequence b0, b1, .... Property (2) follows because β1(b) is strictly increasing, b > b0 and
β1(b0) = b1 ≥ b0 = pi0(b).
Now assume that (1)-(4) hold for n = 1, ..., s− 1. We claim that they hold for n = s. Note
that βs(b) is continuous by induction hypothesis (3) and the continuity of k(·, ·). Again, by
Lemma 6 and induction hypothesis (3), βs(b) is strictly increasing. So (1) is confirmed. (3) is
immediate by definition of pis (b). By the definition of βs(·),
k(βs(b0), pis−1(b0)) = βs−1(b0) = bs−1,
k(βs(b1), pis−1(b0)) = βs−1(b1) = bs.
By the definition of bs and the uniqueness of βs, we know immediately that
βs(b0) = bs,
βs(b1) = bs+1.
Therefore (4) is confirmed. Note that
βs(b) > βs−1(b) > pis(b).
We immediately get property (2) for n = s.
So far, we have shown that βn is a one-to-one and onto map from the interval (b0, b1]
into (bn, bn+1]. This implies that for any initial belief b ∈ (bs, bs+1], there exists a unique
b∗ ≡ β−1s (b) ∈ (b0, b1]. Moreover, it is easy to see that the sequence {βs−1(b∗), ..., β0(b∗), v}
form a sequence of equilibrium cutoffs for the game starting with belief b. This establishes the
claim.
Next, we show that the equilibrium constructed above is the unique equilibrium.
Lemma 9 For all initial beliefs b ∈ (bs, bs+1], in any equilibrium, trade must be completed in
exactly s+ 1 periods. Moreover, there is a unique such equilibrium.
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Proof: Step 1: We first show that this is true for s = 0, i.e., there are no equilibria that last
more than 1 period for b ∈ (b0, b1] and there is a unique such equilibrium in which the first
seller charges v.
First, note that there exists b∗ very small such that the game ends in one shot. Then
consider b ∈ (b∗, b∗ + ε], where ε is such that for any v ∈ [b∗, b1],
(F (b)− F (b− ε)) b < F (b) v
or (




If in equilibrium seller 1 chooses a cutoff in (b∗, b∗ + ε) , then it contradicts the choice of ε. If in
equilibrium, seller 1 chooses a cutoff in (v, b∗], then the game ends in two periods. Then from
Equation (26) seller 1’s problem is
k(b, v) = arg max
k≥v
[F (b)− F (k)] [(1− δ) k + δv] .
Since the game ends in two periods, we know k(b, v) > v. Therefore, by the monotonicity
established in Lemma 6, k(b, v) is strictly increasing in b. Therefore for b ≤ b1, we have k(b, v) ≤
k(b1, v) = v. Contradicting the assumption k(b, v) > v. That is, the game must end in one period
if b ∈ (b∗, b∗ + ε].
Now consider v ∈ (v∗ + ε, v∗ + 2ε]. In equilibrium, the period 2 cutoff cannot be in (v +
ε, v∗ + 2ε] because of the choice of ε. If the period 2 cutoff is in (v, v∗ + ε], then the game ends
in two periods. But we can apply the previous argument again to derive a contradiction. The
proof for this step is completed by induction.
Suppose it is true for s = 1, 2, ..., N − 1 and consider b ∈ (bN , bN+1].
Step 2: We first show that the game ends in exactly N + 1 periods.
Step 2.1: Suppose there exists an equilibrium that lasts longer than N + 1 periods. Then,
it must be the case that in this equilibrium, the first seller with initial belief b chooses a cutoff
k˜1 > bN , because, by the induction hypothesis, for any smaller cutoff the game ends in exactly
N additional periods. Similarly, the second seller with initial belief k˜1 chooses a cutoff level
k˜2 > bN−1 (note that this does not exclude the case where k˜2 > bN) and the sth seller with initial
belief k˜s−1 chooses k˜s > bN−s+1 so that the game lasts more than N + 1 periods. Therefore, the
price that the second seller with initial belief k˜1 charges is strictly greater than
(1− δ)(bN−1 + δbN−2 + ...+ δN−2b1) + δN−1v.
On the other hand, we also know, by Lemma 8, that there is an equilibrium that lasts exactly




Therefore, the price charged by the second period seller with initial belief k∗1 is at most
(1− δ)(bN−1 + δbN−2 + ...+ δN−2b1) + δN−1v.
But then, the first seller in the candidate equilibrium chooses a higher cutoff than the first
seller in the equilibrium of Lemma 8, even though both of these sellers have the same initial
belief and the second period price is less in the latter equilibrium. Since the optimal cutoff is
decreasing in the continuation price, this is a contradiction by Lemma 6.
Step 2.2: Now, suppose there is an equilibrium that lasts N periods or less.
Suppose, first, that the cutoff kˆ1 that the first seller with belief b chooses in equilibrium is
less than bN−1. Thereafter, there is a unique continuation equilibrium in which for all s the
cutoff chosen by the sth seller with belief kˆs−1 is at most bN−s. Therefore, the price charged by
the second seller is at most
(1− δ)(bN−2 + δbN−3 + ...+ δN−2b1) + δN−1v.
On the other hand, the cutoff k∗s chosen by seller s in the equilibrium of Lemma 8 is strictly
greater than bN−s. And, therefore, the price is strictly above
(1− δ)(bN−2 + δbN−3 + ...+ δN−2b1) + δN−1v.
But this is a contradiction since k(b, p) is decreasing in p.
Now suppose that kˆ1 > bN . Let s be the first period when the cutoff kˆs ≤ bN . Then it must
be that kˆs ≤ bN−s, because for any k ∈ (bN−s, bN ], there is a unique continuation equilibrium
that lasts at least N − s + 1 periods. Now, consider the equilibrium constructed in Lemma 8,
starting from initial belief βN−s(kˆs). Then, by construction, the seller with this belief chooses
kˆs. Moreover, by the induction hypothesis, the continuation of this equilibrium coincides with
the continuation of the other equilibrium where kˆs−1 chooses kˆs. This implies that the next
period price is the same in both equilibria. Call this price p. Note that kˆs−1 > bN > βN−s(kˆs).
But this is a contradiction since k(kˆs−1, p) > k(βN−s(kˆs), p).
Step 3: Step 2 establishes that for b ∈ (bN , bN+1], all equilibria last exactly N + 1 periods.
We show that this equilibrium is unique – the one we constructed in Lemma 8.
Suppose by contradiction there is another equilibrium (in addition to the one constructed
in the proof of Lemma 8) that lasts exactly N + 1 periods. Let k∗ be the first period cutoff of
the equilibrium constructed in the proof of Lemma 8. Then, k∗ ≤ bN . Let k′ be the first cutoff
of the other equilibrium. Then it must be that k∗ 6= k′ because there is a unique N period
equilibrium following cutoff k∗ by the induction hypothesis.
Now, if k′ ≤ bN , it must be that k′ > bN−1, since otherwise the equilibrium lasts at most
N −1 periods. Suppose, w.l.o.g., that k∗ > k′. Then it must be the case that the second period
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price in equilibrium of Lemma 8 is higher than the second period price following k′. This is
because, in the unique continuation equilibrium, all cutoffs are increasing in the initial belief,
since the functions βs(·) are increasing; and because, after each of these cutoffs, the equilibrium
lasts exactly N additional periods. But this leads to a contradiction since k(b, p) is decreasing
in p.
Now, suppose k∗ > bN . Now, we use an argument similar to the one used to establish that
all equilibria last at least N + 1 periods. Let s be the first period when the cutoff kˆs ≤ bN .
Then it must be that bN−s ≤ kˆs ≤ bN−s+1, because that is the only way that the equilibrium
will have N − s+ 1 additional periods. Now, consider the equilibrium constructed in Claim 1,
starting from initial belief βN−s(kˆs). Then, by construction, the seller with this belief chooses
kˆs. Moreover, by the induction hypothesis, the continuation of this equilibrium coincides with
the continuation of the other equilibrium where kˆs−1 chooses kˆs. This implies that the next
period price is the same in both equilibria. Call this price p. Note that kˆs−1 > bN > βN−s(kˆs).
But this is a contradiction since k(kˆs−1, p) > k(βN−s(kˆs), p).
B Proof of Theorem 2
B.1 Preliminary Results
Notice that, under the transparent regime, the second period price (on or off the equilibrium
path) can depend only on the first period price, as this is the only observable history. Also,
following an off-equilibrium first period price, seller 2 may play a mixed strategy. Let pˆTR2 (p)
be the expected second period price if the first period seller in the transparent regime chooses
p.
We first establish some preliminary results. The next lemma establishes that the profit
maximization prices of any seller is non-decreasing in the highest type k¯ that he believes to
be remaining, regardless of the continuation play. Note that the solution to this maximization
problem may not be unique. Therefore, the monotonicity claim requires the definition of an
ordering of sets. The appropriate definition in this context is as follows:
Definition 1 Let X, Y ⊂ R. We say that X is greater than Y if and only if for all x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y , x ≥ y.
Lemma 10 The solution to the problem of choosing p to maximize [F (k¯)− F (k(p))]p is non-
decreasing in k¯.
Proof: This follows because the objective function has increasing differences in k¯ and p.
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Clearly, for any p, there exists at most a unique k that satisfies
p = (1− δ)k + δpˆTR2 (p),




p = (1− δ)kNTR1 (p) + δpNTR2 .
Lemma 11 kTR1 (p) is non-decreasing in p.
Proof: Take p > p′ and suppose that kTR1 (p) < k
TR
1 (p
′). Then, by Lemma 10
p = (1− δ)kTR(p) + δpˆ2(p) ≤ (1− δ)kTR(p′) + δpˆ2(p′) = p′,
a contradiction.
The next lemma shows that in the transparent regime, a deviation by the first seller to a
higher price weakly increases the expected price in the second period.




1 ) ≤ pˆTR2 (p).




1 ) ≤ kTR1 (p). Moreover,
kTR1 (p
TR
1 ) = k
TR
1 (p) contradicts the optimality of p
TR




1 ) < k
TR
1 (p). Then
the claim follows from Lemma 10.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof is by induction on the maximum number of periods that it takes for trade to be
completed. Let T i, i = TR,NTR be the last period during which trade takes place with
positive probability in regime i on the given equilibrium path. First, if max{T TR, TNTR} = 1,
then observability does not play a role and therefore the prices in the two regimes are the same,
and equal to v. Hence, the claim is vacuously satisfied.
Assume that the claim is true when max{T TR, TNTR} = 1, 2, ..., τ . Consider the case where
max{T TR, TNTR} = τ + 1.
Lemma 13 Let pTR1 be any price in the support of seller 1’s strategy in the transparent regime.
Then, pˆTR2 (p
TR
1 ) ≥ pNTR2 . That is, the expected second period price in the transparent regime fol-
lowing any equilibrium path history is no less than the second period price in the non-transparent
regime.
32
Proof: Suppose pˆTR2 (p
TR
1 ) < p
NTR








1 ). To see this,
note that from the second period onward, all trade takes place in at most τ periods in either
regime, and hence the induction hypothesis applies. Now, by the induction hypothesis and
Lemma 10, if kTR1 (p
TR
1 ) ≥ kNTR1 (pNTR1 ), then pˆTR2 (pTR1 ) ≥ pNTR2 which establishes the claim.
For the rest of the proof, we let ki1 ≡ ki1(pi1), i = NTR, TR. That is, ki1 is the equilibrium
marginal type that purchases in period 1 in regime i.
Let pi1(k) be the supremum of prices in the inverse of k
i
1(p); that is for each k, p
i
1(k) is the
supremum of prices at which seller 1 in regime i can choose to sell to the marginal type k in
period 1. Clearly, seller 1’s payoff in regime i cannot be strictly less than (1 − F (k))pi1(k) for
any k.
Now, since pNTR1 is seller 1’s unique optimal price in the non-transparent regime, we have
that
(1− F (kTR1 ))pNTR1 (kTR1 ) < (1− F (kNTR1 ))pNTR1 (kNTR1 )
which can be re-arranged as
1− F (kTR1 )










1 )− F (kTR1 )









In words, for seller 1 in the non-transparent regime, an increase from kTR1 to k
NTR
1 of the
cutoff type that he trades with decreases the probability of trade by a factor of
F (kNTR1 )−F (kTR1 )
1−F (kNTR1 )
,
but is accompanied by a percentage increase in price of
pNTR1 (k
NTR




, which is larger
than this factor. Therefore, such a switch is desirable. The rest of the proof argues that
the same switch to the cutoff kNTR1 from cutoff k
TR
1 strictly increases the payoff of seller 1 by
showing that in the transparent regime, this switch is accompanied by an even larger percentage



















1 ) = p
TR
1 = (1− δ)kTR1 + δpˆ2(pTR1 ) < (1− δ)kTR1 + δpNTR2 = pNTR1 (kTR1 ).
Here, the inequality follows from the supposition that pˆ2(p
TR





1 )− pNTR1 (kTR1 ) = (1− δ)(kNTR1 − kTR1 )
≤ (1− δ)(kNTR1 − kTR1 ) + δ(pˆTR2 (pTR1 (kNTR1 ))− pˆTR2 (pTR1 ))
= pTR1 (k
NTR
1 )− pTR1 (kTR1 ).
33
Here the inequality follows by Lemma 12, because kTR1 (p
TR




1 ) and therefore,
pTR1 (k
TR
1 ) ≤ pTR1 (kNTR1 ). But then we have
F (kNTR1 )− F (kTR1 )








which contradicts the optimality of kTR1 for seller 1 in the transparent regime.
Next we argue that the first period price of the transparent regime is larger than the first
period price in the non-transparent regime:
Lemma 14 Let pTR1 be any realized first period price in the transparent regime. Let p
NTR
1 be
the first period equilibrium price of the non-transparent regime. Then, pTR1 ≥ pNTR1 .
Proof: For a contradiction suppose that there exists pTR1 in the support of seller 1 in the
transparent regime such that pTR1 < p
NTR
1 .
Since seller 1 in the non-transparent regime has a unique optimal strategy, we have
1− F (kNTR1 (pNTR1 ))








1 ))− F (kNTR1 (pTR1 ))








1 ))− F (kNTR1 (pTR1 ))




1 ) + ∆
NTR)− F (kNTR1 (pTR1 ))




1 ))− F (kTR1 (pTR1 ))




1 ) + ∆
TR)− F (kTR1 (pTR1 ))
1− F (kTR1 (pTR1 ))
,
where ∆i ≡ ki1(pNTR1 )− ki1(pTR1 ), i = TR,NTR.
Now we observe that:
1. kNTR1 (p
TR
1 ) ≥ kTR1 (pTR1 ). This is because
pTR1 = (1− δ)kNTR1 (pTR1 ) + δpNTR2 = (1− δ)kTR1 (pTR1 ) + δpˆTR2 (pTR1 )
and by Lemma 13, pNTR2 ≤ pˆTR2 (pTR1 ).
2. ∆NTR ≥ ∆TR. This is because
kNTR1 (p
NTR









1 )− kTR1 (pTR1 ).





1 ) + ∆
NTR)− F (kNTR1 (pTR1 ))





1 ) + ∆
TR)− F (kNTR1 (pTR1 ))





1 ) + ∆
TR)− F (kTR1 (pTR1 ))
1− F (kTR1 (pTR1 ))
,
where the first inequality follows from the second observation and the second inequality follows
from the first observation together with the assumption of increasing hazard rate. Combining
this with (27), we get
F (kTR1 (p
NTR
1 ))− F (kTR1 (pTR1 ))














which contradicts the optimality of pTR1 for seller 1 in the transparent regime.
We complete the proof of Theorem 2 with the following lemma:
Lemma 15 Assume that max{T TR, TNTR} = τ + 1. Then for any t, pTRt ≥ pNTRt .
Proof: The proof is by induction. We have already shown that pTR1 ≥ pNTR1 . Take t′ ≤ τ + 1
and assume that for all t < t′, the claim is true. Suppose pTRt′ < p
NTR







t′−1 ), because otherwise, by the induction hypothesis and by Lemma 10,
we would have pTRt′ ≥ pNTRt′ . But then,
pTRt′−1 = (1− δ)kTRt′−1(pTRt′−1) + δpTRt′ < (1− δ)kNTRt′−1 (pNTRt′−1 ) + δpNTRt′ ,
a contradiction. This completes the proof of the theorem.
C Proof of Theorem 3
Let {kTRt } be a realization of equilibrium cutoffs in the transparent regime and {kNTRt } be the
equilibrium sequence of cutoffs in the non-transparent regime with the convention that kit = v
for t > T i where T i is the latest period such that trade takes place with positive probability
(along the realized path). Define two random variables, X and Y , with the following cumulative
distributions:
Prob(x ≤ k) = δτTR(k),
where τ(k) is the unique number that satisfies k ∈ [kτTR(k), kτTR(k)−1) and
Prob(y ≤ k) = δτNTR(k),
where τ(k) is the unique number that satisfies k ∈ [kτNTR(k), kτNTR(k)−1).
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In words, the support of X is the equilibrium cutoffs in the transparent regime, whereas
the support of Y is the equilibrium cutoffs in the non-transparent regime. The marginal types
trading at time t or earlier in each regime have a total probability of δt−1 under the relevant
random variable.










Prob(x ≤ k˜)dk˜ =
∞∑
t=τTR(k)
(1− δ)δt−1(k − kTRt )
and ∫ k
v
Prob(y ≤ k˜)dk˜ =
∞∑
t=τNTR(k)
(1− δ)δt−1(k − kNTRt )
First assume that τTR(k) ≥ τNTR(k). Then,
∞∑
t=τNTR(k)
(1− δ)δt−1(k − kNTRt )−
∞∑
t=τTR(k)




(1− δ)δt−1(kTRt − kNTRt ) +
τTR(k)−1∑
t=τNTR(k)




(1− δ)δt−1(kTRt − kNTRt )
≥0
where the first inequality is by the fact that k ≥ kNTRt for all t ≥ τNTR(k) by the definition of the




(1− δ)δt−1(k − kNTRt )−
∞∑
t=τTR(k)




(1− δ)δt−1(kTRt − kNTRt )−
τNTR(k)−1∑
t=τTR(k)





(1− δ)δt−1(kTRt − kNTRt )−
τNTR(k)−1∑
t=τTR(k)




(1− δ)δt−1(kTRt − kNTRt )
≥0
where the first inequality follows because by definition of τNTR(k) for t < τNTR(k) we have
k ≤ kNTRt and the last inequality follows from the price ranking.
The proof of Theorem 3 immediately follows from the following lemma:
Lemma 17 If F is concave then,
∞∑
t=1




Proof: Notice that for the random variables defined above
Prob(x = kTRt ) = Prob(y = k
NTR
t ) = δ
t−1 − δt = (1− δ)δt−1.
Then the left- and right-hand sides of the above inequality are the expectation of F (x)/(1− δ)
and the expectation of F (y)/(1 − δ), respectively. Then the claim follows by second-order
stochastic dominance.
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